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Politics and the Police in Scotland: The Impact of Devolution 
 
Kenneth B. Scott∗  
 
Abstract 
The creation of a Scottish Parliament and Scottish government in 1999, under the process of 
devolution within the UK, created a significantly different constitutional and political landscape 
from that which preceded it. The impact on domestic issues in Scotland, such as policing, has 
been considerable. This is partly because of new structural arrangements, including the creation 
of a Justice Minister and a Justice Committee of the Parliament, and partly because of the 
significance of the law and order agenda within Scottish politics. This paper discusses the 
impact of these developments on the Scottish police. Analysis focuses on the growing 
involvement of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish governments in key areas such as 
constabulary independence, police accountability and the management of police resources. 
Through this discussion, the paper seeks to make a contribution to the debate about the 
relationship between the police and politics, and the extent to which policing in Scotland is 
becoming increasingly politicised. 
 
Introduction 
The single most important change in Scotland in recent times has been the Scotland Act 1998, 
the legislation which brought about constitutional devolution. The creation of a Scottish 
Parliament with full legislative powers in domestic policy has created a significantly different 
constitutional and political landscape from that which preceded it, one which now focuses on 
nearby Holyrood instead of distant Westminster [10]. As a significant part of Scotland’s 
domestic affairs, policing now indisputably lies within the remit of the devolved Parliament and 
a Scottish government. The impact on Scottish policing has been considerable. This is partly 
because of new structural arrangements, including the creation of a Justice Minister and a Justice 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament, and partly because of the increased significance of the law 
and order agenda within Scottish politics. 
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Policing in Scotland has always been a local service, locally delivered and locally accountable. 
There are eight territorial forces whose boundaries are co-terminus with the former local 
government regions created in 1975: Central Scotland, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, 
Lothian and Borders, Northern, Strathclyde and Tayside. There is a great imbalance in this 
structure in that Strathclyde Police covers half of the country, includes about 50% of the 
population, and deals with around 60% of the crime, while the other seven forces police the other 
half of Scotland. Of Scotland’s 17,000 police officers half are based in Strathclyde, while some 
forces, such as Dumfries and Galloway and Northern Constabularies have quite small numbers, 
540 and 777 respectively, much fewer than in a single division within Strathclyde [29].  
Historically, policing in Scotland has always had a strong community focus, even before 
‘community policing’ was developed internationally as a specific strategy in its own right [7].  
Links with local government and the idea that policing was not only about law enforcement, but 
had an important role to play in the welfare of local communities has been well established since 
the nineteenth century [2]. At the same time, there has been a recognition that certain support 
services require to be made available to all forces on a national basis. In particular, elements of 
training, the maintenance of criminal records, and the development of information technologies 
have been provided through common police service organisations such as the Scottish Police 
College and the Scottish Criminal Record Office.  
 
Governance and accountability structures are based on the tripartite model championed in the 
1962 report of the Royal Commission on the Police [24]. That model includes roles for central 
government, originally fulfilled by the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Scottish Office, for 
local government through police boards consisting entirely of councillors nominated from 
constituent councils within the force area, and the chief constable with direction and control over 
all operational matters and all staff, whether police officers or those in civilian support posts [8].       
 
The evolution and impact of the devolution settlement on policing has created what has been 
called ‘a moving landscape’ [9] within which Scotland’s territorial police forces and central 




-       a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh with 129 MSPs, some of whom are directly elected 
from constituencies (‘Constituency’ MSPs) on the traditional first-past-the-post system 
and some who are elected on the basis of proportional representation from  eight regional 
electoral lists (‘List’ MSPs) through the Additional Member System method; 
 
- a Scottish government composed of MSPs, led by a First Minister, and collectively 
known in terms of the Scotland Act as Scottish Ministers, including a Justice minister, 
usually a senior politician  who has responsibility, inter alia, for policing in Scotland [8]. 
 
The traditional view of the police in Britain has been one of non-partisanship in politics and, as 
Reiner has argued, historically this has been a central factor in the establishment of police 
legitimacy [23]. The corollary of that has been the adherence in both law and practice to the 
principle of constabulary independence, whereby politicians, both at national and local levels, 
are excluded from direct influence on decision-making in operational policing, this being 
accepted as the preserve of the chief constable alone. This applies equally in the Scottish system 
where chief constables have ‘sole overall responsibility for the efficient administration and 
management of police operations’ [26]. There remains, however, a question mark over the point 
at which political oversight is appropriate as against the point at which constabulary 
independence is inviolate. In the increasingly complex world of contemporary policing, Stenning 
has proposed that the broad distinction between ‘operational’ and ‘non-operational’ areas is 
arguably no longer sufficiently clear or useful to warrant the complete exclusion of 
democratically-elected bodies and the general public from key areas of accountability of a major 
service dependent on public finance [36]. This tension is central to the relationship between 
policing and politics.  
 
Prior to devolution, the relationship between policing in Scotland and the politicians was clearly 
marked by the geographical distance between Scotland and London. Policing was only one of a 
myriad of responsibilities held by the Secretary of State for Scotland in the British cabinet, 
supported by a Scottish Office in both London and Edinburgh. It was normal for one of the 
ministers of state in the Scottish Office to hold the portfolio for ‘home’ affairs, and this was 
paralleled by supporting civil servants within an omnibus Scottish Home and Health Department, 
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in which ‘Police Division’ constituted but one small administrative section. The result was that 
Scottish policing had an incredibly low political profile. Even on those occasions when the 
police became the subject of major debates in the House of Commons, such as during the 1990s 
when the impact of the Sheehy Committee led to the Conservative Government’s policies and 
legislation focusing on police reform, Scottish policing was little more than a minor appendage 
to the political process. Indeed, contentious miners strikes in Scotland in the mid-1980s, part of 
the UK-wide strikes, which led to intense clashes between police and strikers, failed to ignite 
debate of politicization in the way it did south of the border.  
 
Within Scotland the key political relationships for chief constables were always with local 
government in the form of the police boards which comprised the local leg of the tripartite 
system. Each force had its own police board, which was comprised of members of the local 
council. As the most significant power which these boards exercised was the appointment of 
senior officers, especially chief constables, their influence lay almost entirely in appointing 
whom they regarded as the right person for the job in the first instance. Thereafter, the local 
politicians’ duty was to ensure that the chief had the resources to police the area with no input at 
all to any operational issues. In the largely non-party political world of Scottish local 
government, this permitted chief constables to be almost entirely unencumbered by political 
intervention and in an immensely powerful position both constitutionally and personally [21, 4]. 
The tri-partite structures were but nominally operational. This is far removed from the situation 
in England and Wales where policing has, since the 1980s, been a highly politicised activity. 
 
Since the devolved institutions have come into being, the situation appears to have changed 
bringing the interaction between politics and policing sharply into focus. The changes and 
emerging new relationship between the two moved one former chief constable to remark two 
years after the Scotland Act that: ‘telling officers how many criminals to arrest is not the function 
of a minister of state. When this becomes a habit, it is a danger to the public, the politician and 
the police. . . [Now] politics is infecting the police like Aids.’1 The aim of this paper is to analyse 
the post-devolution relationship between politics and policing in Scotland. In particular, 
consideration will be given to interactions between the police and the key structures in the new 
                                                 
1
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model of governance and administration of Scotland: the Scottish Parliament and Scottish 
Ministers. 
 
The Scottish Parliament and Policing 
Quite deliberately, the Scottish Parliament has sought to avoid some of the perceived pitfalls of 
the Westminster parliamentary system. The architects of Holyrood decided that the political 
process had to be more accessible, more open and more responsive, and ought to encourage the 
widest-possible public participation and scrutiny of policy and legislation [14]. Consequently, 
politicians are now much closer to issues of concern to the electorate. With a four-year fixed 
term for the Parliament there is no scope for MSPs to influence the timing of when they have to 
face that electorate;  MSPs are physically much more accessible to their constituents than MPs at 
Westminster; and, in principle, should be in a much better position to scrutinise, monitor, query 
and question public agencies and government departments. Of course, the Scottish electorate is 
now somewhat spoiled for choice as far as representation is concerned, with not only one 
‘constituency’ MSP but also seven ‘list’ MSPs in addition to a Westminster MP, seven European 
Parliament MEPs and three or four local councillors in each multi-member local council ward. 
For senior police officers this can create situations in which they have to deal with the same 
issue, complaint or grievance on more than one occasion from an array of elected members 
competing with each other for attention. 
 
Law and order is a significant electoral issue in Scotland and is often ranked in the top three 
issues of importance to voters in Scottish opinion polls alongside health and education. It is also 
important because of the existence of Scots law and criminal procedure as a separate jurisdiction 
within the UK. Criminal justice legislation and policy making are therefore key areas for MSPs 
and the Parliament has been keen to establish its populist credentials. Over one third of all the 
Acts passed by the Scottish Parliament since 1999 have been about criminal justice, not 
necessarily about policing directly, but certainly about many matters in which the police have a 
vested interest. These include the regulation of investigatory powers [22, a law banning fox-
hunting with dogs [20], the expansion of anti-social behaviour offences [1], the introduction of a 
new offence of sexual grooming [18], the extension of the use of electronic monitoring [5],  
procedures for vetting and disclosure of persons unsuitable for working with children [19], and 
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reform of the law on sexual offences [35]. Many of these expand policing powers in ways which 
potentially infringe on human rights, raising legitimate questions as to how the police exercise 
those powers and, relatedly, how they are held to account for their actions. As Holyrood is now 
responsible for enacting this legislation, MSPs take on a greater role in both asking and 
answering these questions.  
 
The one piece of legislation passed by the Scottish parliament directed specifically at policing 
has been very significant. The Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006 is 
arguably the first parliamentary Act since 1967 to deal in a fundamental way with various 
aspects of the Scottish police. Its main provisions relate to the setting up of a new central service 
agency, the Scottish Police Services Authority (SPSA) which was created in 2007 to bring 
together in a more coordinated way than before the existing common support services, namely 
the Scottish Police College, Scottish Criminal Record Office, the quaintly named Scottish Police 
Information Strategy, and the police forensic science laboratories [33]. It is a Non-Departmental  
Public Body which has a staff of over 1600 and a budget of £100 million annually. With its own 
board it operates independent of Government, though is still accountable to Holyrood. The Board 
is appointed by Ministers and consists of Chief Constables, joint police board conveners and lay 
persons. Each individual ‘business’ area has its own head, which is a member of the overall 
executive committee, managed by a Chief Executive who reports to the Board.  
 
The significance of SPSA lies primarily in the centralising tendency which it represents. Its 
creation makes sense in terms of a joined-up organisation of primarily backroom services on a 
national basis. It is also regarded, of course, as a means of expanding national policing services 
at the expense of the eight local forces, with the centralisation of both forensic science and 
information technology even although the resources for these continue to be located within 
forces. The possibility of other support services, for example recruitment and procurement, 
coming under the aegis of SPSA in the future may be seen as either an opportunity or a threat, 
depending on one’s view of the direction in which police organisational structures in Scotland 




The 2006 Act also placed on a statutory basis the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency 
(SCDEA) and prescribed its relationships to both SPSA and Scottish Ministers. The original 
Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency (SDEA), of which SCDEA is the successor, was set up in 
2001 as part of the Scottish government’s response to the war on drugs [25]. It was defined in 
legal terms as a common service under the 1967 Police (Scotland) Act, but in practice it was 
conceived of primarily as an arm of frontline policing. This proved problematic, not least 
because the Agency’s staffing depended on secondments of officers from the other eight forces.  
As a result SDEA primarily developed as an intelligence-gathering organisation, involved in 
anti-money-laundering activities, witness protection and hi-tech crime whilst also becoming the 
external face of Scottish policing in a range of collaborations with UK, European and 
international police bodies. In particular, its work began to move away from combating drug 
crime on the streets to focusing on the criminal networks responsible for the trafficking of drugs 
and other goods in the form of serious organised crime. This is revamped by the 2006 Act which 
establishes a complex foundation for the re-named Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement 
Agency. The Board of the Scottish Police Services Authority (SPSA) has the duty of 
‘maintaining’ SCDEA and ‘providing’ the other central services. In a sense, the governance of 
SCDEA mirrors the broader tripartite system in Scottish policing, with a balance between central 
government, a body representing the ‘community’ (in this case the SPSA Board) and the head of 
the police organisation itself. Essentially, SPSA acts in similar fashion to a local police board: it 
provides the resources for SCDEA to carry out its functions. The director-general, a police 
officer who holds the rank of deputy chief constable, has, like local chief constables, overall 
operational control. However, the Agency’s priorities are set by Scottish Ministers rather than 
the police service, especially in relation to its high-profile activities against serious organised 
crime and, because these have become a central plank of the current Scottish Government’s 
crime control policies [28], the relationship with central government is undoubtedly the main 
influence on SCDEA operations. The centralisation documented by Conway and Walsh in 
relation to policing in Ireland is clearly also embedding itself in Scotland.  
 
The 2006 Act also address a source of much debate and discussion in Scotland: the procedure for 
dealing with complaints by members of the public against police officers. Traditional practice is 
based on a purely internal investigation by the police itself, although where the complaint relates 
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to a senior officer this may involve another force. Where a criminal offence is involved the 
matter is referred to the procurator-fiscal, the local prosecutor in the Scottish system. The key 
issue here is the matter of independence and transparency. There is often considerable suspicion 
of a lack of both in situations where the police investigate themselves [6]. On this issue Scotland 
is clearly lagging behind its neighbouring jurisdictions all of which have for some time now 
engaged an external body at some point in the complaints procedure.  
 
The 2006 Act created a new office of Police Complaints Commissioner for Scotland (PCCS). 
This body is markedly different from the complaints bodies established in the last decade in 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland. The Commissioner acts as an independent reviewer of 
how the police handle complaints made against them by members of the public, not as the actual 
investigator of complaints. This does not do away with the police investigating themselves, but it 
does add an extra stage of redress if a complainant is unhappy with the initial police 
investigation. The Commissioner may require a chief constable to reconsider a complaint or to 
take other appropriate action. So far the work of the PCCS has begun to have a significant effect 
on police complaints in several ways: the considerable number of cases referred to it (just over 
4,500 for 2010); its exposure of inefficiencies and poor practice in police handling of complaints; 
and the promotion of higher standards in police conduct [16]. For instance, the Commissioner 
has the power, under the legislation, to return complaints to forces for reconsideration where he 
feels that the complaint has not been properly investigated. In November 2010, eleven complaint 
reviews were published and involved returning complaints to seven forces for reconsideration. 
One particular review included the conclusion that the Chief Inspector of Northern 
Constabulary’s response to a complaint was ‘not convincing’ and that the Commissioner did not 
believe ‘that the complaint was dealt with in a reasonable manner’. This particular report 
concludes with a ‘learning point’ section and how complaints of the particular type should be 
handled [17]. 
 
Also of great importance is the gathering and dissemination of greater information about police 
complaints themselves. Previously this would have been handled either by forces themselves or 
by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland for whom complaints would have 
been just one aspect of their work, whereas now dedicated reports are being published on 
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complaints on an annual basis. These provide substantive details as to the nature of the 
complaints, details as to the level of officer complaints are directed at, emerging trends in 
complaints and how complaints are handled and disposed. While this may be a step in the right 
direction of providing an element of independence and transparency to the complaints procedure, 
it is however still open to criticism on the grounds that it is less complete in these regards than 
are police complaints procedures elsewhere in the UK and in other jurisdictions. Primary among 
these criticisms is the fact that complaints themselves are not independently investigated. 
 
Included in the 2006 Act there are also extensions to police powers in relation to arrests for the 
carrying of offensive weapons and for offences involving the possession of fireworks, as well as 
clarifying police powers in relation to the taking of samples, including DNA, and the procedures 
pertaining to the retention of such samples especially in relation to those charged with serious 
violent and sexual offences. The police are also empowered to apply directly to a sheriff court 
for the issue of football banning orders for use against those engaging in violence or disorder in 
relation to football matches. This, in part, reflects the fact that MSPs are themselves more 
accessible to the representations of groups and individuals, including police associations such as 
the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS), Association of Scottish Police 
Superintendents (ASPS) and the Scottish Police Federation. Under devolution accessibility has in 
reality become a two-way street.  
 
Looking beyond the 2006 Act, at governance structures, a further strength of the Scottish 
Parliament is its committee system which deals not only with the progress of legislation, but can 
also initiate enquiries into any topic within its remit [14]. Amongst the busiest and most 
influential of these is the Justice Committee. Against a background at the 2007 Scottish 
Parliament elections of promises by the various parties to increase police numbers, the Justice 
Committee commenced an inquiry in 2008 into the effective use of police resources. While this 
inquiry took as its starting point the political debate about how many more ‘bobbies on the beat’ 
the Scottish National Party government was going to deliver, it very soon broadened out into a 
wider range of policing issues [31]. The Committee’s final report included recommendations on, 
and some very considered critiques of, the role and responsibilities of the police, the 
effectiveness of local police boards, the value of surveys of the public conducted by the police, 
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and the use of civilian staff and others in releasing sworn officers for frontline duties. It is 
probably the closest that Scottish policing has come so far to a repeat of the landmark 1962 
Royal Commission on the Police, though on a more limited scale and it was not entirely 
surprising that the Committee recommended that the Scottish government should set up an 
independent commission to review policing for the new century. That this has not been fully 
implemented also illustrates the limitations of parliamentary committee reports, but the fact that 
a Parliamentary body had seriously probed a range of policing issues was in itself an 
encouraging development in terms of police accountability.   
 
The Committee followed this up with a further report on community policing and brought to 
Edinburgh a number of national and international experts to discuss this [32]. Although this 
report was less substantial, the Committee was very critical of what Scottish forces were 
currently doing in terms of engaging with communities and pursuing high visibility patrols to 
reassure the public. In particular, MSPs were unhappy with the fact that only two forces were 
able to produce community policing strategies when asked to do so. The role of governance and 
the tri-partite system in effective community policing was apparent. For instance, the Committee 
called for an enhanced role of Scottish Government in ensuring that forces meet their obligations 
in terms of delivering community policing. And in relation to the fact that many community 
police officers reported being redirected from their task when other situations arose the 
Committee stated: “To ensure that abstractions of community police officers from their 
communities are minimised, it is critical that force policies are effectively monitored. The 
Committee recommends that police boards and authorities should undertake this role.” [32: para 
161]. 
 
What is clear from this review is that the impact of the Scottish Parliament has been considerable 
on Scottish policing at a range of levels: through new legislation which affects police 
organisation and work; through the scrutiny of Parliament’s committees; and through the 
involvement of individual MSPs raising issues with senior officers within their constituencies. 
Compared to the previous relationship with UK parliamentarians, Scottish policing is much more 




Scottish Ministers and Policing 
The statutory description for the devolved government of Scotland, according to the Scotland 
Act 1998, is ‘Scottish Ministers’. The collective term for the executive branch of government has 
varied depending on its political composition at the time. From 1999 to 2007 the Labour-Liberal 
Democrat coalition which had a majority in the Scottish Parliament described itself as the 
‘Scottish Executive’. Following the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections the Scottish National 
Party formed a minority administration and formally use the term ‘Scottish Government’.  
Whatever the terminology, government has become increasingly involved in matters relating to 
Scottish policing.   
 
One aspect of this is the opportunity which devolution provides for governments to develop their 
own Scottish-based policies to deal with problems that have a particularly Scottish dimension to 
them. Much of the legislation enacted by the Scottish Parliament has been based on ministerial 
initiatives, for example in relation to the management of violent and sexual offenders [12], 
serious organised crime [3] and tackling the perennial Scottish problem of knife-carrying [5]. 
However, since devolution, justice ministers have also been extremely active in promoting many 
new policies relating to crime and justice which have an effect on police work. These often have 
their roots in political responses to public opinion rather than emerging from the policy-making 
of police organisations themselves.  For example, government campaigns to deal with domestic 
abuse have been important in placing this issue very firmly on the police agenda for action [27]; 
funding from Scottish governments has been important for developing the ground-breaking work 
of Strathclyde Police’s Violence Reduction Unit in seeking long-term solutions to Scotland’s 
high rate of violent crime [37]; and a template of seven community policing engagement 
principles has been laid down for police forces to follow [30]. Above all, the funding of an 
additional 1,000 police officers by the Scottish Government, as promised in the SNP’s election 
manifesto of 2007, has been achieved on the assumption of a particular policing strategy, namely 
that they will be used for proactive, high-visibility, community-facing policing. All of this 
suggests, at least, a very active engagement by Ministers with the detail of policing which has 




Politicians, the public and political commentators now appear to be adopting a much more 
critical stance towards the police than in the past, and Ministers in particular are much more open 
in the demands that they feel they can make on chief constables and their forces. Examples of 
such demands being made include: 
• In May 2001 the Justice Minister of the day publicly directed the police to increase the 
detection of racist incidents and drug seizures. 
• In May 2003 the First Minister at that time told the annual conference of ACPOS:  
‘People tell me there’s no point ‘phoning the police because they cannot do anything, 
they don’t have the powers and the laws to back them up. Or that they take too long to 
come and when they do, they stay in the car and don’t get out…’ [13]. 
• On several occasions during 2004 the First Minister called chief constables to Edinburgh 
to meet with him to discuss significant issues of law and order of concern to Ministers. 
• In January 2005 the First Minister, commenting on the new ACPOS guidelines on minor 
complaints and low level intimidation, said that he wanted the police ‘to ensure that anti-
social behaviour legislation is observed in spirit and to the letter.’2  
• In April 2007 the First Minister called in the ACPOS executive and warned that those 
police forces not using the new dispersal orders under anti-social behaviour legislation 
may be forced into doing so by the government. As a result, there was some significant 
increase in the use of such powers by chief constables. 
 
Each of these incidents represents a level of engagement and involvement with policing that was 
absent in Scottish politics prior to devolution. Underpinning this greater involvement by 
Ministers in policing is a significant formalisation of how police efficiency is determined. A set 
of national targets was put in place by Scottish Ministers, based on consultation with both police 
and local government bodies, but this has now given way to a more fully developed Scottish 
Policing Performance Framework. The Framework covers four main areas of activity and 
organisation, and includes 12 high level Objectives and 38 performance measurements [34]. The 
idea is eventually to develop a website which can provide, initially to police board members, 
then to members of the public, data on policing at the most local levels. While this Framework is 
the outcome of joint working between ACPOS and Audit Scotland, the body which audits the 
                                                 
2
 “Scots police chiefs plan to ignore minor crimes to boost efficiency” The Scotsman, 3 January 2005. 
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accounts and activities of public service organisations, the fact that it is co-ordinated by HM 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, the government’s main advisers on policing, makes it clear that the 
direction is coming from the politicians in order to strengthen police accountability. 
 
This ‘hands-on’ approach to policing by Scottish politicians is not universally appreciated.  
Understandably, not everyone in police circles is comfortable with this situation: partly because 
political popularity potentially brings with it greater political control, and partly because it 
endangers that political neutrality to which the Scottish police has traditionally and strenuously 
adhered. However, the official reaction of the police service leadership, ACPOS, has generally 
been one of acceptance of the new relationship. There is some evidence from the period of the 
UK Government’s police reforms in the early 1990s to suggest that chief constables were 
prepared in the last resort to accede to the wishes of elected politicians [15]. If anything, that 
position has become more frequent under devolution, propelled by the tendency of ACPOS to 
operate increasingly as a corporate body with individual chief constables more often than not tied 
into national positions and policies as a result of its representational processes. Through 
discussions with ACPOS, or at least its office-bearers, the Scottish government has been able to 
express its views very directly to the police leadership.   
 
Scottish Ministers and MSPs have also been strong enough to face up to some of the long-
standing social problems that have bedevilled Scottish public life and which public policing 
needs to confront. From a police perspective, this may have added to the ever-expanding policing 
mandate, but it has provided strong encouragement to the police to develop strategies for dealing 
with those problems. In some of these areas at least, including prostitution, sectarianism, and 
Scotland’s woeful record on alcohol abuse and its social effects, the result has been a measure of 
improvement in the quality of local community life through effective policing [10].  
 
Conclusion 
The new constitutional context in which the police in Scotland now operates is therefore much 
more political than it was under the previous arrangements and the amount of interaction 
between the police and politicians has increased significantly. In terms of the interaction between 
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policing and politics, the devolution settlement in Scotland seems to illustrate three main 
consequences, which may have relevance in other jurisdictions as well. 
 
Firstly, proposed on the basis of less interference by government and politicians, devolution has 
created a new relationship between politics and policing which involves much more activity by 
government and politicians than previously. This is largely a result of the importance of law and 
order to the Scottish electorate, the focus of Scottish politicians on relatively self-contained 
domestic issues such as policing, and the ease with which, in a small country, policy-makers are 
able to develop close working relationships with key police personnel.   
 
Secondly, proposed on the basis of decision-making becoming more open and transparent, 
devolution in Scotland has led to widespread changes in Scottish policing taking place often 
through administrative mechanisms rather than through publicly scrutinised legislative 
approaches. This usefully avoids challenging directly the doctrine of constabulary independence 
and chief constables’ authority in respect of operational decisions. It also raises questions about 
those who advise the politicians on policing policy. The influence of the Justice Department in 
the day-to-day interactions between the Scottish government and the police remains an uncharted 
area. Nonetheless, it is likely that the increase in Scottish government activity in relation to 
policing has been underpinned by an equivalent increase in involvement by civil servants in 
policing policy-making. 
 
Thirdly, proposed on the basis of power being given away by the centre, devolution has in reality 
meant a greater degree of centralisation by Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Parliament at a 
more local level. The purpose of devolution has been the withdrawal of the UK government and 
parliament from certain areas of activity to allow a greater self-determination in domestic areas 
of policy not only in Scotland, but in Northern Ireland and Wales as well. As far as Scottish 
policing is concerned, the argument here is that there is a centralising tendency whereby the 
initiative in and direction of policing rests to a greater extent with the politicians in Edinburgh 




In terms of Stenning’s arguments about democratic accountability [36], the Scottish situation has 
moved from one in which political involvement in police decision-making was almost 
exclusively related to the provision of resources to one in which politics impacts on 
organisational policies, priority-setting and even, at times, on the deployment of resources.  
 
The impact of devolution has been to leave the traditional boundaries of constabulary 
independence much less secure, but in doing so it may be paving the way for a model in which 
there is a potentially better balance between legitimate political oversight and properly 
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